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Opening Remarks for the Investiture of the O’Neill Institute
It is wonderful for me to have one of my dearest friends, Richard Diamond, say
such warm words. It was because of Wendy Williams, Judy Areen, and Pat King that I
came to Georgetown. And I have been happy every minute here, with the most talented
group of colleagues and friends that I could possibly have on this terrific Georgetown
faculty.
President DeGioia, Dean Aleinikoff, Mr. and Mrs. O’Neill, Faculty, and Students,
thank you for this high honor. President DeGioia, your leadership exemplifies this great
university. We are all fortunate to be in a place whose Jesuit spirit stands for justice and
service to others. And your signature work on globalism, health, and AIDS is deeply
important to our city, the nation, and the world.
Dean Aleinikoff, it was you, Dean Bette Kelner, and Kevin Conry who nurtured
this idea and made it grow into the reality that it is today. The three of deserve all the
recognition for day and the Institute’s bright future. And Mary Matheron has been a
guiding and steady hand.
Linda and Tim O’Neill, thank you for making this dream come true. Your
confidence in us has been humbling. Getting to know you and your family, and the values
and principles you stand for, has inspired us and given me great happiness. I pledge to
you that we will mightily pursue the mission of the O’Neill Institute of seeking
innovative solutions to the world’s most pressing health problems. We have a remarkable
leadership team at the Institute, including Gregg Bloche, Bernhard Liese, David Vladeck,
Tim Westmorland, and Ben Berkman. And to Wendy Perdue and James Hodge for our
unique Global Health LL.M. program. We have an unbeatable partnership between the
Law Center and the School of Nursing and Health Studies.
My family and closest friends from near and very far are surrounding me today,
and that feels very good. My dear sister Judy and her husband Phil, and her lovely
daughter Sari and her husband Aaron have come to share this special day. My father and
mother, Joe and Lillian, have come from NYC. This Saturday, my father celebrates his
91st birthday, and I hope he will do what he did on his 90th, which is to ride his bicycle.
(Talk about public health!).
One of Georgetown’s best and brightest is here, but he also happens to be my
eldest son Bryn. I am bursting with pride for the wonderful person Bryn is and the sheer
joy that he and his brother give to Jean and I. My youngest son Kieran is taking exams at
a rival law school. His Dad forbid him from coming today!
Many years ago, I held a very tense press conference when I chaired the UK’s
National Inquiry into the deeply contentious miners dispute. I frantically called my wife
Jean and she said calmly: “My dear, I put your speech in your left hand pocket.” Well,
this summer my lovely English bride and I celebrate our 30th Anniversary. So, this
Lecture is dedicated to you Jean—30 Years in Love.
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This lecture searches for solutions to the most perplexing problems in global
health—problems so important that they affect the fate of millions of people, with
economic, political, and security ramifications for the world’s population. No State,
acting alone, can insulate itself from major health hazards. The determinants of health
(e.g., pathogens, air, food, water, even lifestyle choices) do not originate solely within
national borders. Health threats inexorably spread to neighboring countries, regions, and
even continents. It is for this reason that safeguarding the world’s population requires
cooperation and global governance.
If I am correct that ameliorating the most common causes of disease, disability,
and premature death require global solutions, then the future is demoralizing. The States
that bear the disproportionate burden of disease have the least capacity to do anything
about it. And the States that have the wherewithal are deeply resistant to expending the
political capital and economic resources necessary to truly make a difference to improve
health outside their borders. When rich countries do act, it is often more out of narrow
self-interest or humanitarian instinct than a full sense of ethical or legal obligation. The
result is a spiraling deterioration of health in the poorest regions, with manifest global
consequences for cross-border disease transmission and systemic affects on trade,
international relations, and security.
Suppose that States were convinced that amelioration of global health hazards
was in their national interests or that they otherwise accepted the claim that they have an
ethical or legal obligation to act. Would the consequent funding and efforts make a
difference? If past history is any guide, the answer is no. Most development assistance is
driven by high profile events that evoke public sympathy, such as a natural disaster in the
form of a hurricane, tsunami, draught, or famine; or an enduring catastrophe such as
AIDS; or politicians may lurch from one frightening disease to the next, irrespective of
the level of risk ranging from anthrax and smallpox to SARS, Influenza A (H5N1), and
bioterrorism.
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What is truly needed, and which richer countries instinctively (although not
always adequately) do for their own citizens, is to meet what I call “basic survival
needs.” By focusing on the major determinants of health, the international community
could dramatically improve prospects for good health. Basic survival needs include
sanitation and sewage, pest control, clean air and water, tobacco reduction, diet and
nutrition, essential medicines and vaccines, and well-functioning health systems. Meeting
everyday survival needs may lack the glamour of high-technology medicine or dramatic
rescue, but what they lack in excitement they gain in their potential impact on health,
precisely because they deal with the major causes of common disease and disabilities
across the globe.
If meeting basic survival needs can truly make a difference for the world’s
population, and if this solution is preferable to other paths, then how can international law
play a constructive role? Extant legal solutions have deep structural faults. The most
glaring problem, widely debated by scholars, is whether international legal instruments
and global institutions can effectively govern the diverse State and non-State actors that
influence health outcomes. Setting normative standards and assuring follow-through are
particular problems in health—more so than in other fields of international law. But even
this governance debate does not address the hardest problem in global health.
International law seems ineffective in creating incentives, let alone binding obligations,
to provide funding, services, or protection for the world’s poorest people. But this is
exactly what is required to solve the most intractable problems in global health.
If law is to play a constructive role, it will require an innovative way of
structuring international obligations and this, in turn, will require States to accede to a
new model. A vehicle such as a Framework Convention on Global Health (FCGH) could
be a starting point. Such a Framework Convention would commit States to a set of
targets, both economic and logistic, and dismantle barriers to constructive engagement by
the private and charitable sectors. It would have to stimulate creative public/private
partnerships and actively engage civil society stakeholders. A FCGH could set achievable
goals for global health spending as a proportion of GNP; define areas of cost effective
investment to meet basic survival needs; build sustainable health systems; and create
incentives for scientific innovation. The World Health Organization (WHO) or a newly
created institution could set ongoing standards, monitor progress, and mediate disputes.
A FCGH, or similar mechanisms would not be easy to achieve politically or
provide an ideal solution. But, at least, a Framework Convention would go to the heart of
the problem—finding creative ways to engage States, the private sector, and civil society
to find sustainable solutions to improve prospects for a healthier and longer life for the
world’s population.
This lecture first inquires why governments should care about serious health
threats outside their borders, and explores the alternative rationales. Second, I examine
the compelling issue of global health equity, and ask whether it is fair that people in poor
countries and regions suffer such a disproportionate burden of disease, disability, and
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premature death. Third, I describe how the international community focuses on a few
high profile, heart-rending, issues while largely ignoring deeper, systemic problems in
global health. By focusing on basic survival needs, the international community could
dramatically improve prospects for the world’s population. Finally, I explore the value of
international law itself, and propose an innovative mechanism for global health reform—
a Framework Convention on Global Health.
I. Global Health: A Matter of National Interest?
It is axiomatic that infectious diseases do not respect national borders. But this
simple truth does not convey the degree to which pathogens migrate great distances to
pose health hazards everywhere. Human beings congregate and travel, live in close
proximity to animals, pollute the environment, and rely on overtaxed health systems. This
constant cycle of congregation, consumption, and movement allows infectious diseases to
mutate and spread across populations and boundaries. The global population is also
vulnerable to bioterrorism—the deliberate manipulation and dispersal of pathogens.
These human activities, and many more, have profound health consequences for people
in all parts of the world, and no country can insulate itself from the effects. The world’s
community is interdependent and reliant on one another for health security.
This brief description about the inexorable spread of disease across countries and
continents might well lead to the conclusion that global health is in every nation’s
interest. Indeed, a compelling case can be made that large-scale health hazards have such
catastrophic consequences for the health of the populace, the economy, and national
security that international cooperation is a matter of vital State interest. The relationship
between extremely poor health and dire economic and political consequences is far too
complex to be expressed in simple cause and effect terms. Instead, it can be explained by
how poor health contributes to State instability and how State instability, in turn, creates
the conditions for poor health.
A. National Interests in the Health of the Populace
Democratic theory holds that the common defense, security, and welfare of the
population are among the State’s primary obligations—goods that can be achieved only
through collective action. The populace can tolerate even the most catastrophic events if
they are unforeseeable and unpreventable. But if political leaders fail to take steps in
advance that could have ameliorated a natural-occurring epidemic or bioterrorism, the
political price would be high. The political consequences for failure to act early and
decisively with respect to outbreaks of SARS, BSE and FME, for example, were evident
in North America and Europe. The politics of infectious diseases can be seen in the fact
that pandemic influenza planning has reached the highest levels of government, with
enormous resources expended, even though Influenza (A) H5N1 has resulted in only a
few hundred human deaths worldwide and none in the United States.
If governments have an obligation to ensure at least reasonable conditions of
health, they have no choice but to pay close attention to health hazards beyond their
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borders. DNA fingerprinting has provided conclusive evidence of the migration of
pathogens from less to more developed countries. In fact, more than thirty infectious
diseases have newly emerged over the last 2-3 decades, ranging from Hemorrhagic
Fevers, Legionnaires Disease, and Hanta virus to West Nile Virus and monkeypox.
Vastly increased international trade in fruits, vegetables, meats, and eggs has resulted in
major outbreaks of foodborne infections caused by Salmonella, E. coli bacteria, and
Norwalk-like viruses.
Not only do emerging and re-emerging diseases increasingly affect the wealthiest
countries, but also they are less able to ameliorate these harms through technologies such
as vaccines and pharmaceuticals. Resurgent diseases such as tuberculosis, malaria, and
HIV have developed extreme resistance to front-line medications. As microbes change
genetic form, existing vaccines and pharmaceuticals become inapt. The therapeutic
challenges are not limited to exotic infections, as WHO has warned that many pathogens
are gaining resistance to therapies, including common respiratory, diarrheal, and ear
infections.
The State’s response to disease epidemics also has profound domestic costs.
Disease control measures such as travel restrictions, school closures, and quarantines can
cause personal detachments, disrupt social and economic life (education, trade, business),
and infringe individual rights. Powerful reasons, therefore, exist for governments to pay
close attention to global health, not only for the sake of people in far away places but to
prevent potentially catastrophic social, economic, and political consequences for their
own citizens.
B. National Economic Interests: Trade and Commerce
Even the most powerful countries have a narrow interest in preventing the
migration of large-scale health threats to their shores. But beyond narrow self-interest, are
there broader, “enlightened” interests in redressing extremely high rates of disease and
premature death in the world’s poorest regions? There is a strong case that a forwardlooking foreign policy would seek to reduce enduring, intractable diseases in developing
countries.
Epidemic disease dampens tourism, trade, and commerce, as the 2003 SARS
outbreaks demonstrated. Animal diseases such as FMD, BSE, and avian influenza
similarly had severe economic repercussions on trade and commerce, with mass cullings
of flocks and herds, and provoked trade bans on beef, lamb, or poultry. Massive
economic disruption would ensue from a pandemic of human influenza, with a projected
loss of up to 6% in global GDP.
In regions with extremely poor health, economic decline is almost inevitable.
HIV/AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa accounts for 72% of global AIDS deaths. Average life
expectancy in this region is now 47 years, when it would have been 62 without AIDS.
For some of the worst affected countries such as Botswana, life expectancy has declined
from 75.7 to 34.2 years of age. Most of the excess mortality is among young adults aged
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15-49, leaving the country without entrepreneurs, a skilled workforce, parents, and
political leaders. The World Bank estimates that AIDS has reduced GDP nearly 20% in
the hardest-hit countries. AIDS, of course, is only one disease in countries experiencing
multiple epidemics, starvation and massive poverty, and regional conflicts that devastate
the population.
Countries with extremely poor health become unreliable trading partners without
the capacity to develop and export products and natural resources; pay for essential
vaccines and medicines; repay debt; and require increased financial aid and humanitarian
assistance. In short, a foreign policy that seeks to ameliorate health threats in poor
countries can benefit the public and private sectors in developed, as well as developing,
countries.
C. National Security
Extremely poor health in other parts of the world can also affect the security of
the United States and its allies. Research shows a correlation between health and the
effective functioning of government and civil society. The CIA, for example, finds that
high infant mortality is a leading predictor of State failure, and the State Department
called AIDS a national security threat. States with exceptionally unhealthy populations
are often in crisis, fragmented, and governed poorly. In its most extreme form, poor
health can contribute to political instability, civil unrest, mass migrations, and human
rights abuses. In these States, there is greater opportunity to harbor terrorists or recruit
disaffected people to join in armed struggles. Politically unstable States require
heightened diplomacy, create political entanglements, and sometimes provoke military
responses.
Diseases of poverty overwhelming are concentrated in sub-Saharan Africa, and it
is no surprise that many of these political and military entanglements occur in that region.
The rest of the world, however, has largely been insulated from the devastation wrought
by these endemic diseases. The explanation for this “awful dissonance” may lie in the
region’s marginal strategic importance. Sub-Saharan Africa has weak political, military,
and economic power.
The same cannot be said about the burgeoning health crises emerging in pivotal
countries in Eurasia, such as China, India, and Russia. These countries are in the midst of
a “second wave” of HIV/AIDS, which mirrors the earlier explosion in Sub-Saharan
Africa. The HIV prevalence in the Ukraine and the Russian Federation, for example, have
risen twenty-fold in less than a decade. In the decades ahead, the center of the global
HIV/AIDS pandemic is projected to shift from Africa to Eurasia.
The HIV/AIDS crisis in Eurasia is exacerbated by additional emerging health
problems. Recall that infant mortality is a prime predictor of State instability. Russia’s
official infant mortality rate (which is thought to be vastly under-reported) is 3-4 times
higher than in North America and Western Europe, and similar levels are found in parts
of India and China. Of children who are born alive, nearly two-thirds will be unhealthy,
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many suffering lifelong illness and disability. Women’s reproductive health is also poor,
with nearly half of all pregnant women being malnourished and sick, many losing their
babies before term.
Eurasia is a region of high strategic importance in terms of its population,
economic and military prowess, and political influence. It has more than 60% of the
world’s inhabitants; one of the highest combined GNPs; and at least four massive armed
forces with nuclear capabilities. But due to extreme health hazards, Eurasia will suffer
economic, political, and military decline. Political instability in a region with such
geostrategic importance will have major international ramifications.
D. Do States Perceive Global Health to be in Their National Interests?
Governments, therefore, have powerful reasons based on narrow or enlightened
self-interest to ameliorate extreme health hazards beyond their borders. But do political
leaders acknowledge, and act on, this evidence? The answer may be that States are
beginning to understand, but their engagement in global health is relatively limited. And
the sad truth is that the coincidence of interests is narrower than activists, and even
scholars, have suggested. As U.K. Chancellor Gordon Brown said when launching the
International Finance Facility for global health in 2003, rich countries “just don’t care
enough.”
There is little doubt that developed countries are beginning to see global health as
essential to their national interests. OECD countries have increased development
assistance for global health over the last two decades, rising from nearly $2 billion in
1990 to $12 billion in 2004. At the same time, philanthropic organizations have devoted
historic sums to global health. The Gates Foundation alone will donate up to $3 billion
per year. This development assistance may appear substantial, but sits modestly beside
the annual $1 trillion spent on military expenditure and $300 billion on agricultural
subsides.
The increase in development assistance, moreover, is largely attributable to
extensive resources devoted to a few high profile problems: AIDS, pandemic influenza,
and the Asian tsunami. Even factoring in these new investments, most OECD countries
have not come close to fulfilling their pledges of giving 0.7% of Gross National Income
(GNI) per annum. OECD countries would have to invest an additional $100 billion by
2015 to close the vast investment gap. With these additional expenditures, WHO projects
that tens of millions of lives would be saved every year.
Rather than a general commitment to global health, States often prefer “targeted
engagements” to prevent only those hazards deemed most likely to affect their own
citizens. National security assessments and international agreements offer relatively
narrow justifications for State action on global health. Governments frame the problem as
one of averting direct threats of infectious diseases reaching their borders, and not to
reduce extremely poor health in impoverished countries.
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In many respects, States may be correct that true global engagement does not
serve their interests. Richer countries almost always have relative health advantages over
poorer countries. The technological capacity to produce drugs and vaccines, the
sophisticated health systems, and the simple fact that their populations generally are
richer and healthier, means that developed countries usually can safeguard their citizens
by looking inward. One need only examine the historical and current data on health
disparities discussed next to understand that highly developed countries can, and will,
maintain comparatively high levels of population health by focusing the bulk of their
resources on domestic needs.
II. Global Health Disparities: Are Profound Health Inequalities Fair?
Perhaps it does not, or should not, matter if global health serves the interests of
the richest countries. After all, there are powerful humanitarian reasons to help the
world’s least healthy people. But even ethical arguments have failed to capture the full
attention of political leaders and the public.
It is well known that the poor suffer, and suffer more than the rich. Unfortunately,
this is also true with respect to global health. What is less often known is the degree to
which the poor suffer unnecessarily. The global burden of disease is not just shouldered
by the poor, but disproportionately so, such that health disparities across continents
render a person’s likelihood of survival drastically different based on where she is born.
These inequalities have become so extreme and the resultant effects on the poor so dire,
that health disparities have become an issue no less important than global warming or the
other defining problems of our time.
The current global distribution of disease has led to radically different health
outcomes in developed and developing countries. Disparities in life expectancy among
rich and poor countries are vast. Average life expectancy in Africa is nearly 30 years less
than in the Americas or Europe. Life expectancy in Zimbabwe or Swaziland is less than
half that in Japan; a child in born in Angola is 73 times more likely to die in the first few
years of life than a child born in Norway; and a women giving birth in sub-Saharan
Africa is 100 times more likely to die in labor than a women in an rich country. While
life expectancy in the developed world increased throughout the twentieth century, it
actually decreased in the least developed countries and in transitional States such as
Russia. As little as one concrete example offers a sense of perspective on the global
health gap. In one year alone, 14 million of the poorest people in the world died, while
only four million would have died if this population had the same death rate as the global
rich.
A. Diseases of Poverty: Preventable Suffering
The diseases of poverty are endemic in the world’s poorest regions, but barely get
noticed among the wealthy. Diseases such as elephantiasis, guinea worm, malaria, river
blindness, schistosomiasis, and trachoma are common in poor countries, but are largely
unheard of in rich countries. Beyond morbidity and premature mortality, the diseases of
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poverty cause physical anguish, for example, when a two-foot long guinea worm parasite
emerges from the genitals, breasts, extremities, and torso with excruciating pain; or
filarial worms cause disfiguring enlargement of the arms, legs, breasts, and genitals; or
river blindness leads to unbearable itching and loss of eyesight.
B. Who Has the Responsibility to Ameliorate the Vast Disparities in Global Health?
A core insight about health disparities is that there are multiple causal pathways to
numerous dimensions of disadvantage. The causal pathways to disadvantage include
poverty, poor education, unhygienic and polluted environments, and social disintegration.
These, and many other causal agents, lead to systematic disadvantage not only in health,
but also in nearly every aspect of social, economic, and political life. Inequalities of one
kind beget other inequalities, and existing inequalities compound, sustain, and reproduce
a multitude of deprivations in well-being.
Human instinct tells us that it is unjust for large populations to have such poor
prospects for good health and long life simply by happenstance of where they live.
Although almost everyone believes it is unfair that the poor live miserable and short
lives, there is little consensus about whether there is an ethical, let alone legal, obligation
to help the downtrodden. When are health inequalities between different societies unjust,
and what do wealthier societies owe as a matter of justice to the poor in other parts of the
world? Even if reasonable people believed that health disparities were morally wrong,
they would be hard pressed to answer the difficult questions: Why are inequalities unfair?
Who is responsible for ameliorating the high rates of illness and death? And what level of
assistance is ethically warranted?
Are disparities ethically wrong? A Theory of Human Functioning
Many scholars and activists simply assert that global health disparities are
unethical, suggesting that inequalities are self-evidently wrong or that they violate
fundamental human rights. But, stating that inequalities are unfair, without more, does
little to explain why it is so. Nor is an appeal to human rights convincing because, used in
this way, “rights discourse” is just another rhetorical device without explanatory power.
The internationally recognized “right to health,” as explained further below, principally
focuses on States’ obligations to meet the health needs of their own populations. In any
event, the text of an international legal instrument cannot be read as a principled ethical
argument that State A owes a duty to improve the health of State B’s population.
Perhaps the strongest claim that health disparities are unethical is based on what I
call a theory of human functioning. Health has special meaning and importance to
individuals and the community as a whole. Health is necessary for much of the joy,
creativity, and productivity that a person derives from life. Individuals with physical and
mental health recreate, socialize, work, and engage in family and social activities that
bring meaning and happiness to their lives. Every person strives for the best physical and
mental health achievable, even in the face of existing disease, injury, or disability.
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Perhaps not as obvious, health also is essential for the functioning of populations.
Without minimum levels of health, people cannot fully engage in social interactions,
participate in the political process, exercise rights of citizenship, generate wealth, create
art, and provide for the common security. A safe and healthy population builds strong
roots for a country’s governmental structures, social organizations, cultural endowment,
economic prosperity, and national defense. Population health becomes a transcendent
value because a certain level of human functioning is a prerequisite for activities that are
critical to the public’s welfare—social, political, and economic.
Amartya Sen famously theorized that the capability to avoid starvation,
preventable morbidity, and early mortality is a substantive freedom that enriches human
life. Depriving people of this capability strips them of their freedom to be who they want
to be and “to do things that a person has reason to value.” Under a theory of human
functioning, health deprivations are unethical because they unnecessarily reduce one’s
ability to function and the capacity for human agency. Health, among all the other forms
of disadvantage, is special and foundational, in that its effects on human capacities
impact one’s opportunities in the world.
Does a duty exist to rectify these disparities?
Not everyone accepts the claim that health has a special value because it is
necessary for human functioning, agency, and opportunity. But even if this theory were
sufficient, it would still not answer the harder question about the corresponding
obligation to do something about global inequalities. First and foremost, what creates
such a duty? Whose duty is it? And what is the scope of that duty, if there is one?
Even liberal egalitarians who believe in just distribution, such as Nagel, Rawls,
and Walzer, frame their claims narrowly and rarely extend them to international
obligations of justice. Their theories of justice are “relational” and apply to a fundamental
social structure that people share. States may owe their citizens basic health protection by
reason of a social compact. But positing such a relationship among different countries
and regions is much more difficult. Those arguing for a non-statist view of health
obligations might point to an increasingly interdependent world—social, political, and
economic. They see a global community that sets norms regarding world health, and a
network of international organizations and rule making. But, whether this international
order requires fair terms of cooperation, let alone wealth transfer to poorer States, is far
from well accepted outside activist circles.
Perhaps there is no principled ethical argument because it is so hard to craft. A
way forward might be to use international law, so that States can accede to a set of shared
responsibilities, with a fuller understanding of what they are agreeing to, and why. I will
propose a FCGH later in this Lecture, but before doing so it is necessary to explain more
precisely the kind of obligation that I think is necessary to enshrine in a Framework
Convention.
III. Basic Survival Needs: Ameliorating Suffering and Early Death
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Global health is fashionable these days, with expressions of sincere concern and
increased funding by political leaders, humanitarians, activists, and even celebrities. But
is all this funding and interest likely to be successful in reducing extremely poor health?
The answer is that most international aid is ineffective, even counterproductive.
Undoubtedly, the current spate of support will wane, as the international community has
only a limited attention span and resources. And when it does, it is conceivable that the
least healthy people in the world will be in the same, or worse, position.
Admittedly, there are no clear solutions to complex problems in global health.
But, we do know how to ameliorate much of the suffering and early death. The answer is
disarmingly simply, if only it could rise on the agendas of the world’s most powerful
countries. Mobilizing the public and private sectors to meet basic survival needs,
comparable to a Marshall Plan, could dramatically transform prospects for good health
among the world’s poorest populations.
A. Reframing the Approach to Development Assistance
Currently, international development assistance is often driven by emotional, high
visibility events such as large-scale natural disasters, diseases that capture the public’s
imagination, or diseases with the potential for rapid global transmission. These funding
streams, however, skew priorities, and divert resources from building stable local systems
to meet everyday health needs.
A relatively small number of wealthy donors currently wield considerable
influence in setting the global health agenda. Although well meaning, this small group of
wealthy countries and philanthropists often sets priorities that do not reflect local needs
and preferences. Sometimes donors exert control over the use of funds that discourages
local leaders from taking ownership. For example, the Bush Administration’s insistence
on abstinence, fidelity, and faith-based programs undermines effective HIV prevention.
Similarly, development banks have encouraged or required poor countries to “cap”
internal spending on health as a condition of loans or debt relief. Donors often fund
politically popular projects, rather than what is most likely to improve global health,
leading experts to conclude, “Funding is skewed towards what people in the West want to
deliver.”
International health assistance, moreover, is fragmented and uncoordinated. Relief
agencies and NGOs often establish programs that compete with each other and, still
worse, compete with local government and businesses. Rather than integrating policies
and programs within local hospitals, clinics, and health agencies, they set up state-of-the
art facilities that overshadow and detract from governmental and private enterprises.
Foreign philanthropists can offer salaries and amenities that are far more generous than
those that can be offered locally. As a result, local innovation and entrepreneurship are
stifled; talented individuals in business, health care, and community development migrate
to foreign-run programs; and the local health industry cannot profit or easily survive.
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Many humanitarian initiatives also set narrow, short-term goals that do not
improve basic infrastructure and create sustainable systems. Donors want quick,
observable, and quantifiable results. By focusing so narrowly, often donors fail to see the
long-term benefits of building human resources and sustainable health systems.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the massive infusion of humanitarian
assistance into a very poor countries can lead to reliance and dependency. If charity is the
main vehicle for health improvement, it means that local government and businesses lose
the desire and ability to solve problems on their own. One day, the foreign cash, clinics,
medicines, and aid workers will leave. And when that happens, the least healthy will be
no better off, and perhaps worse off, unless they gain the capacity to meet their own basic
health needs.
It is important to stress that host countries also bear responsibility for the failure
of international development assistance. Many poor countries spend a minute percentage
of their GDP on health, preferring to spend on the military or other perceived needs. At
the same time, some governments misappropriate foreign health assistance, whether by
excessive bureaucracy, incompetence, or corruption. The World Bank estimates that
roughly half of all foreign health funds in sub-Saharan Africa do not go for health
services on the ground, but are spent on payments for non-existent services, counterfeit
drugs, equipment diverted to the black market, or bribes.
B. Defining Basic Survival Needs as a Measure of International Health Assistance
Reframing the approach to international developmental assistance requires
interventions that substantially improve the health and wellbeing of the world’s least
healthy people. I propose shifting assistance to what I call basic survival needs, namely
those needs essential to restoring human capability and functioning. Basic survival needs
include immunizations, essential medicines, nutritional foods, potable water, sanitation,
pest abatement, public health infrastructures, primary health care, and health education.
Vaccines are the most cost effective means of preventing infectious diseases that
we know. Vaccine-preventable diseases are virtually extinct in developed countries but
still kill millions of children and adults annually in poorer regions. Activists fervently
lobby for universal access to anti-retroviral (ARV) medications for AIDS, as they should.
ARVs now cost hundreds of dollars annually per person, down from thousands, but they
must be taken daily and for a lifetime. In contrast, a single annual dose of Mectizan
costing a couple of dollars rids the body of intestinal worms, relieves the unbearable
itching of river blindness, and prevents loss of eyesight. Basic sanitation and water
systems would vastly reduce improve global health at minimal cost, such as clean water
kits costing as little as $3. An insecticide-treated bednet, which costs roughly $5, is
highly effective in reducing malaria, river blindness, elephantiasis, and other insect-borne
diseases among children. But only about one in seven children in Africa sleep under a
net, and only 2% of children use a net impregnated with insecticide.
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Consequently, something as simple as a vaccine, a generic drug, basic
engineering, or sanitation can result in remarkable benefits for the health of the world’s
poorest people. It does not take advanced biomedical research, huge financial
investments, or complex programs.
C. Health Systems: Basic Infrastructure and Capacity Building
There is little doubt that the single most important way to ensure population
health is to build enduring health systems in all countries. States and local communities
must possess well-functioning public health and health care systems with sound
infrastructures and skilled human resources. If the vast preponderance of international
assistance went into helping poor States develop and maintain health systems, it would
give them the tools to safeguard their own populations. What poor countries need is not
foreign aid workers parachuting in to rescue them. Nor do they need foreign run state-ofthe-art facilities. Rather, they need to gain the capacity to provide basic health services
themselves.
Health systems include public health agencies with the ability to identify, prevent,
and ameliorate health risks in the population—disease surveillance, laboratories, data
systems, and a competent workforce. They also include primary health, bringing basic
medical services as close as possible to where people live and work—maternal and child
health, family planning, and medical treatment. Primary care promotes individual and
community self-reliance and participation in the planning, organization, operation and
control of health services, making fullest use of local and national resources.
Human resources are critically important for well functioning health systems. But
the availability of skilled health workers is dangerously low in developing countries. In a
cruel twist of fate, countries with the highest burden of disease also garner the lowest
proportion of the global health workforce. Southeast Asia, which shoulders the largest
share of the global disease burden, has only 12% of the world’s health workforce. Africa
has only 3% of health workers worldwide. In contrast, North America and Europe
command a far larger share of health and medical professionals than their need would
indicate.
Poor countries often do not have the public health, medical, pharmacy, and
nursing schools necessary to train sufficient numbers of HCWs. But, even when
developing countries do train HCWs, many leave for more lucrative positions in richer
countries. For example, in Ghana and Liberia, 30% and 60%, respectively, of the
country’s physicians are working in the U.S. or U.K. Physicians in middle income
countries such as India and Pakistan are similarly moving to the West in droves. The
migration of HCWs is caused by a “push” from depressed working conditions and
opportunities in poor countries and a “pull” from more attractive conditions elsewhere.
North America and Europe represent an overpowering lure for doctors and nurses,
offering salaries and career opportunities that far surpass what could be offered in a
poorer country. The problem is not simply due to diffuse global market forces. Rather,
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OECD countries are aggressively recruiting HCWs, even as they acknowledge the
resulting dire situation in poor countries.
This “brain drain” is leaving poor countries – as many as 57 by WHO calculations
– unable to meet the MDGs because of a shortage of HCWs. Africa would need at least
an additional one million health workers just to offer the services that could meet the
MDGs.
IV. Global Governance for Health: A Proposal for a Framework Convention on
Global Health
To ensure effective and well-functioning health systems in poor countries, and to
meet basic survival needs, the international community, in partnership with host
countries, must invest in health system infrastructure. It is not simply the amount of
money spent that is important, but how those resources are invested and used. This
requires a structured approach that sets priorities, ensures coordination, and monitors
results. The innovative use of international law could provide just such a vehicle for
change. But extant global health governance has been inadequate, and a fresh approach is
badly needed.
A. International Health Law: WHO’s “Thin” Record of Law Making
The WHO Constitution grants the agency extensive normative powers, which it
has never fully exercised. The agency can adopt binding conventions which, unlike
normal treaties, affirmatively require States to “take action” within 18 months. The WHO
also possesses quasi-legislative powers to adopt regulations. WHO regulations, unlike
most international law, are binding on Member States unless they proactively “opt out.”
Despite WHO’s impressive normative powers, modern international health law is
remarkably thin, with only one significant regulation and one treaty in 60 years of
existence. The International Health Regulations (IHRs), until they were revised in 2005,
applied only to cholera, plague, and yellow fever—the same diseases originally discussed
at the first International Sanitary Conference in Paris (1851). The IHRs, therefore,
historically and politically, were intended to prevent trans-migration of disease, rather
than to improve health in poor countries. To be sure, this international instrument is far
more expansive and bold than its predecessors, but it is unlikely to do the work that is
needed in global health—namely, to dramatically improve the plight of the world’s least
healthy people.
The WHO did not create a health convention until 2003, when the WHA adopted
the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC). The FCTC declares the bold
objective of protecting present and future generations from the devastating consequences
of tobacco consumption and exposure. Although a laudable achievement, the FCTC is
almost sui generis because it regulates the only lawful product that is uniformly harmful.
The FCTC was politically feasible because the industry was vilified for denying scientific
realities, engineering tobacco to create dependence, engaging in deceptive advertising,
and targeting youth, women, and minorities.
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B. An Expanded Sphere of International Health Law: The Influence of Trade and
the Human Right to Health
Although international law under WHO’s auspices is sparse, there is a much
larger body of international law that powerfully affects global health in areas ranging
from food safety, arms control, and the environment to trade and human rights. The
WHO should be a leader in creating, or at least influencing, these norms, but that has not
happened. The agency has shied away from the “high politics” of international law
because it has seen itself principally as a scientific, technical agency. Thus, WHO is
comfortable developing technical standards for food safety under the Codex Alimentarius
Commission, but it has not ventured into the harder terrain of WTO rule making and
dispute resolution. It ought to have a great deal to contribute, and have some sway over,
matters of trade in goods and services; sanitary and phytosanitary measures; and
intellectual property rights in vaccines and medicines. Yet, its influence is nowhere to be
found.
It might not matter whether WHO was a prime mover on matters of global health
if extant international norms were adequate, but they are not. International institutions
and social activists increasingly have turned to the language of human rights to articulate
their fondest dreams for global health. And, the international right to health resonates
with bold-sounding obligations for the “highest attainable standard of physical and
mental health.” The WHO Constitution defines health so broadly to be simply
unachievable: “a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being.”
These high-minded declarations have had little normative force, as they lack the
basic features of a “right”: What exactly does the right entail and what obligations do
States, and others, have to conform? When is the right violated? And what are the
mechanisms to enforce the entitlement? Despite considerable progress, recasting the
problem of extremely poor health as a human rights violation does not help for a number
of reasons. First, the legal obligation falls primarily on each State to “respect, protect, and
fulfill” the right to health for its own population. Although the ICESCR posits that all
States have duties to assist and cooperate in achieving economic and social rights, the
obligation to assist other States’ populations cannot become primary. Second, the right to
health itself is expressed as “progressively realizable,” so there can be little agreement as
to when a State has breached an obligation to its people, let alone to people in far away
places. Finally, even if some obligation to offer financial and technical assistance could
be read into human rights instruments, there is no systematic method of implementation
and enforcement. This leaves us with the very problem posited in this Lecture—the duty
to improve the health of the world’s most disadvantaged people falls primarily on those
who lack the means to do so. This is undoubtedly an untenable position if global health is
to be taken as a serious issue of international concern.
C. Toward a Framework Convention on Global Health
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The problem of global health governance has perplexed scholars, and for good
reason. International health law has a number of structural inadequacies—e.g., vague
standards, ineffective monitoring, weak enforcement; and a “statist” approach that
insufficiently harnesses the creativity and resources of non-State actors and civil society
more generally. The question of whether international law can, or should, govern the
diverse entities that influence global health is the subject of intense debate in the
literature. Indeed, modern cutting edge global health governance initiatives eschew
formal international legal regimes, such as the Global Fund, Global Health Security
Initiative, and the International Finance Facility.
If law is to play a constructive role, new models will be required and here I make
the case for a Framework Convention on Global Health. I am proposing a global health
governance scheme incorporating a bottom-up strategy that strives to: build health
system capacity; set priorities to meet basic survival needs; engage stakeholders to bring
to bear their resources and expertise; harmonize the activities among the proliferating
number of actors operating around the world; and evaluate and monitor progress so that
goals are met and promises kept.
The framework convention-protocol approach is becoming an essential strategy of
powerful transnational social movements to safeguard health and the environment. Two
prime illustrations are the Kyoto Protocol to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate
Change and the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. These framework
conventions recognize that a collective effort is necessary to mitigate the threat that
humans pose to health and the environment. Although far from perfect, environmental
and health conventions offer inventive approaches to global governance, including
“common but differentiated responsibilities” for developing and developed countries,
multilateral funding mechanisms, and incentives to facilitate compliance.
A FCGH would represent an historical shift in global health, with a broadly
imagined global governance regime. The initial framework would establish the key
modalities, with a strategy for subsequent protocols on each of the most important
governance parameters. It is not necessary, or perhaps even wise, to specify in detail the
substance of an initial FCGH, but it may helpful to state the broad principles:
1) FCGH mission—Convention Parties seek innovative solutions for the
most pressing health problems facing the world in partnership with nonState actors and civil society, with particular emphasis on the most
disadvantaged populations;
2) FCGH objectives— establish fair terms of international cooperation, with
agreed-upon mutually binding obligations to create enduring health system
capacities, meet basic survival needs, and reduce global health disparities;
3) Engagement and coordination—finding common purposes and process
among a wide variety of State and non-State actors, setting priorities, and
coordinating activities to achieve the mission of the FCGH;
4) State Party, and other stakeholder obligations—incentives, forms of
assistance (e.g., financial aid, debt relief, technical support, subsidies,
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5)

6)
7)
8)

9)

tradable credits), and levels of assistance, with differentiated responsibility
for developed, developing, and least developed countries;
Institutional structures—conference of Parties, secretariat, technical
advisory body, and financing mechanism, with integral involvement of
non-State actors and civil society;
Empirical monitoring—data gathering, benchmarks, and leading health
indicators, such as maternal, infant, and child survival;
Enforcement mechanisms—inducements, sanctions, mediation, and
dispute resolution;
Ongoing scientific analysis—processes for ongoing scientific research and
evaluation on cost effective health interventions, such as the creation of an
Intergovernmental Panel on Global Health, comprised of prominent
medical and public health experts; and
Guidance for subsequent law-making process—content, methods, and
timetables to meet framework convention goals.

The framework convention-protocol approach has a number of advantages
resulting from the incremental nature of the process, and its ability to evolve over a
longer time horizon. The framework agreement allows for the initial codification of
normative parameters, with the expectation of building detailed standards in the future.
The incremental nature of the governance strategy allows the international community to
focus on a problem in a stepwise manner, avoiding potential political bottlenecks over
contentious elements.
The creation of international norms and institutions provides an ongoing and
structured forum for States and stakeholders to develop a shared humanitarian instinct on
global health. A high-profile forum for normative discussion can help educate and
persuade Parties, and influence public opinion, in favor of decisive action. And it can
create internal pressure for governments and others to actively participate in the
framework dialogue. The creation of such a normative community, therefore, may be an
essential element of building an international consensus. The imperatives of global health
have to be framed not just as a series of isolated problems in far-off places, but as a
common concern of humankind. Just as the normative process can shape values, it can
also serve as a forum for experts and policymakers to collect and analyze health data and
scientific evidence.
The really interesting and vital aspect of a FCGH is not merely how it governs
inter-State responsibilities. The critical challenge is how to make it do the really hard
work of mobilizing the diverse drivers of health, including NGOs, private industry,
foundations, public/private hybrids, researchers, and the media. It is essential to harness
the ingenuity and resources of these non-State actors. The FCGH, therefore, should
actively engage major stakeholders in the process of negotiation, debate, and information
exchange, as well as reducing barriers for them to actively engage in capacity building.
A FCGH offers an intriguing approach, potentially creating a process and
structure for an innovative international mechanism for ameliorating complex problems
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in global health. It will not, however, be a panacea, and there are multiple social,
political, and economic barriers to the creation of such a framework convention. The
framework convention-protocol approach cannot easily circumvent many of the
seemingly intractable problems of global health governance: the domination of
economically and politically powerful countries; the deep resistance to creating
obligations to expend, or transfer, wealth; the lack of confidence in international legal
regimes and trust in international organizations; and the vocal concerns about the
integrity and competency of governments in many of the poorest countries.
But given the dismal nature of extant global health governance, a FCGH is a risk
worth taking. It will, at a minimum, identify the truly important problems in global
health. Solutions will not be found solely in increased resources, although that is
important. Rather, an FCGH can demonstrate the imperative of targeting the major
determinants of health, prioritizing and coordinating currently fragmented activities, and
engaging a broad range of stakeholders. It also will provide a needed forum to raise
visibility of one of the most pressing problems facing humankind.
V. A Tipping Point
I have sought to demonstrate why politically and economically powerful countries
should care about the world’s least healthy people. It may be a matter of national interest,
so that helping poor States makes everyone safer and more secure. Or, global health
assistance simply may be ethically the right thing to do to avert an unfolding
humanitarian catastrophe. Or, there may be a growing sense of legal obligation, whether
through WHO treaties and regulations or the international right to health. Although no
single argument may be definitive in itself, the cumulative weight of the evidence is now
overwhelmingly persuasive. Whatever the reasons, perhaps we are coming to a tipping
point where the status quo is no longer acceptable and it is time to take bold action.
Global health, like global climate change, may soon become a matter so important to the
world’s future that it demands international attention, and no State can escape the
responsibility to act.
If that were the case, States would need an innovative international mechanism to
bind themselves, and others, to take an effective course of action. Amelioration of the
enduring and complex problems of global health is virtually impossible without a
collective response. No State or stakeholder, acting alone, can avert the ubiquitous threats
of pathogens as they rapidly migrate and change forms. If all States and stakeholders
voluntarily accepted fair terms of cooperation through a FCGH, then it could
dramatically improve life prospects for millions of people. But it would do more than
that. Cooperative action for global health, like global warming, benefits everyone by
diminishing collective vulnerabilities.
The alternative to fair terms of cooperation through a Framework Convention is
that everyone would be worse off, particularly those who suffer compounding
disadvantages. Absent a binding commitment to help, rich States might find it politically
or economically easier to withhold their fair share of global health assistance, hoping that
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others will take up the slack. Major outbreaks of infectious disease, including extensively
drug resistant forms, would become increasingly more likely. Even if the economically
and politically powerful escaped major health hazards, they would still have to avert their
eyes from the mounting suffering among the poor. And they would have to live with their
consciences knowing that much of this anguish is preventable.
What is most important is that if the global community does not accept fair terms
of cooperation on global health soon, there is every reason to believe that affluent States,
philanthropists, and celebrities simply will move on to another cause. And when they do,
the vicious cycle of poverty and endemic disease among the world’s least healthy people
will continue unabated.
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